The International Monetary Fund yesterday further cut its growth forecast for sub-Saharan Africa. The adjustment adds pressure on governments already revising upwards their financing needs ahead of the next round of debt issuance. The new message, signed by Abebe Selassie, the IMF's director for Africa, calls for growth of 3.8 1GDP3T in 2025, four tenths of a percentage point lower than expected in October 2024. At first glance, this may seem like a cold shower, but the figure takes on a different colour when compared to the 2.8 1GDP3T that the IMF has set for the world as a whole for 2025.
The West African map adds nuances. Senegal is dreaming of double-digit figures thanks to the imminent start-up of production at the Sangomar and Grand Tortue Ahmeyim hydrocarbon fields: the IMF is forecasting an 8.8 % expansion by 2025, a pace that even the Asian Tigers can no longer afford. Côte d'Ivoire is also aiming for 6.4 % growth, driven by its double gold - record-breaking cocoa and crude oil from the Baleine and Calao deposits. Ghana, after undergoing shock therapy to tame debt, is hoping for 4 %; Nigeria, after dismantling a half-century-long petrol subsidy and leaving the naira to fend for itself, will have to settle for 3.2 % growth while inflation still bites into pockets.
None of this is happening in a vacuum. Washington has reignited the protectionist beacon with a 'base' tariff of 10 % on almost all imports and a special punishment of 25 % on cars, steel and aluminium. Brussels, Beijing and half the planet watch the manoeuvre; transport prices rise; logistics chains are reconfigured. For countries dependent on selling oil, cocoa or phosphates, the news means less foreign exchange and more pressure on budgets already stretched by high interest rates.
On 29 January, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger consummated their divorce from ECOWAS. The so-called Sahelian Brexit implies new customs, different passports and the more than likely entry of Russian and Turkish military advisors where French soldiers used to patrol. Every tonne that crosses this strip now pays an extra uncertainty premium, and insurers are raising rates because the risk is not only economic, it is also physical.
As a backdrop, the climate is squeezing. A recent report by the World Meteorological Organisation estimates that weather emergencies already take between 2 and 5 % of African GDP each year and force up to 9 % of public spending to be diverted to floods, droughts and cyclones. In 2024, monsoon rains devastated much of the Sahel and the Niger Basin: 1 460 dead and 8.5 million affected in 20 countries. The price of rice doubled in Kano, Nigeria, and the price of tomatoes soared in Cotonou, Benin, the following week. It is understandable, then, that the IMF warns that without investment in adaptation, agricultural productivity could fall by another 9 % before the end of the decade.
In the offices of Abuja, Accra, Dakar and Abidjan, each government fights its own battle. Nigeria boasts of bravery in abolishing a subsidy that devoured 3 % of GDP, but pays the political cost of 25 % inflation and a naira that lost a third of its value. Ghana cuts current spending, renegotiates $8.7 billion of external debt and hopes the adjustment will stop the cedi bleeding. Senegal, with Bassirou Faye's newly inaugurated presidency, is coping with the discovery of a larger deficit and is clinging to the gas manna to balance the books without stifling social investment. Côte d'Ivoire is caught between the euphoria of cocoa prices - which are benefiting the treasury - and the fear of fiscal overheating ahead of the October 2025 presidential elections.
And then Spain, or rather the Canary Islands, barely 1,400 kilometres from Dakar, comes into view. The archipelago has two assets: the Canary Islands Special Zone, with a 4 % tax, and the legal umbrella of the European Union. These credentials make Las Palmas and Santa Cruz the Atlantic gateway for three lines of business. First, energy services: ship maintenance, provisioning and training for the new Senegalese and Ivorian offshore wells. Second, green transition and water: desalination, floating wind and micro-grids capable of powering Cape Verdean islands or Sahelian villages where diesel is a luxury. Third, the digital back-office: Nigeria leads the continent in attracting fintech capital, but probably needs secure clouds anchored in European law.
Those who fear risk have tools. Mixed financing - grants from the European Global Gateway programme, EIB guarantees and private capital - cushion the first impact. Stabilisation clauses shield contracts from regulatory shocks. Setting aside 10 % of the budget for drainage and parametric insurance prevents the first flood from turning a motorway into a ghost building. And joint ventures with local SMEs reduce the danger of expropriation and, incidentally, generate employment where it is most needed.
The clock, however, is ticking fast. The IMF reminds us that eleven of the twenty economies that will grow the most this decade are African. At the same time, foreign debt is getting more expensive and the dollar rules. Turkey is already financing and building roads, China is extending railways and Russia is selling security to whoever will pay for it. Spain has the advantage of proximity and the European flag, but the top seat is not reserved for itself: it has to be taken.
Because the decisive question is not whether West Africa will grow - that is beyond doubt - but with whom it wants to grow. And the boat, like every morning in Dakar, does not wait for the undecided.