I appeared before a congressional committee warning of the importance of looking towards the Sahel: geopolitics, the Russian presence, the discrediting of Europe and the jihadist threat make for a complex panorama in the coming years.
On 28 May last, just over a week ago, I had the honour of appearing before the International Cooperation Committee of the Congress of Deputies. After reading several of my articles and learning about the work that Casa África is doing to highlight the importance of talking about the Sahel, Cristina Valido, a member of Parliament from the Canary Coalition, considered that it would be appropriate to provide the parliamentary groups with a general analysis of the situation of this enormous strip of territory so close to us and which I have spoken about so many times in the articles that we publish week after week.
I saw this request for a hearing as a great opportunity to bring the Sahel to Congress. Because unfortunately I think it is essential that the Spanish Parliament and its representatives are up to date with current events in Africa. There has been a lot of talk in Congress about Ukraine, a lot of talk about Gaza and a lot of talk about migration, about looking towards the Baltic and enlarging the European Union, but unfortunately there is no talk about the South, there is no talk about the Sahel and its importance for our country.
At this hearing, I took the opportunity to emphasise to the Members of Parliament that, in my opinion, the Sahel is the laboratory of the new world geopolitics, that many factors are coming together such that we must now consider it unacceptable that the Sahel is not much more present in our country's current affairs. Every day new data is emerging that confirms this fact.
For now, as I said in committee, developments on jihadist violence are increasingly worrying. The Sahel is the epicentre of jihadism worldwide, the region that alone accounts for more than half of global terrorism-related deaths. It is paradoxical that this level of insecurity is the main factor behind both the political events (the coups d'état and subsequent imposition of military juntas in the three main countries suffering from this insecurity - Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) and the subsequent withdrawal of European projects that sought to help (obviously we can speak of disappointment and failure of results) to contain this threat.
The paradox is that since the breakdown of the agreements and the withdrawal of European armies from the region, the security situation has worsened. And to illustrate this, a news item from this very week: the JNIM jihadist group (Al Qaeda's branch in the Sahel) claimed responsibility for an attack on the Malian army and Russian soldiers operating in the Koulikoro area, just 60 kilometres from the capital (Bamako) and in the region where Spanish troops patrolled just over a year ago.
Since 2019, terrorist deaths in the area have increased almost tenfold. And JNIM attacks are getting closer to the capital, giving the feeling that everything is getting worse. And at the same time, looking up, jihadist attacks and actions are also increasing in the north of countries such as Benin and Togo, bringing closer these groups' goal of gaining influence in the region and reaching the coastal countries of West Africa. In other words, an outlet to the sea.
Let us remember that this jihadist violence does not exist for a strictly religious reason: it exists because there is a criminal economy behind it, which takes advantage of the vastness of the Sahel and feeds off illicit trafficking, arms, drugs - cocaine, mainly - and people.
From a geopolitical perspective, the establishment of a new Alliance of Sahel States of the three countries with military juntas (the aforementioned Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) has led to their exit from ECOWAS (i.e. the breakdown of political consensus and military cooperation among the 14 West African countries that are members of ECOWAS) and a castling of these three countries, pushing out former Western partners, mainly France but also the whole of the European Union, and forging closer ties with Russia. And this, dear readers, must also be a major source of concern.
Because the withdrawal of French troops is not only confined to the three countries: anti-Western, and more specifically anti-French sentiment (although it is clear that this affects the entire European Union) is also spreading throughout the region. The French have been forced to withdraw their troops and barracks in Chad (completed in January), Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire (completed this 2025).
In light of this new geopolitical situation, I recommend reading Ignacio Fuente Cobo's recently published analysis in the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, where he addresses Russia's growing influence in the Sahel through sophisticated disinformation and propaganda campaigns. These actions have been remarkably successful, especially among African youth, manifesting in a rise in pro-Russian sentiment and the expulsion of Western presence from several countries in the region.
The Russian approach has exploited information vulnerabilities in the Sahel, such as the weakness of local media, the intensive use of social media by young people, and limited access to reliable news. As a result, Russian disinformation has contributed to the destabilisation of the Sahel and to Russia's positioning as a central geopolitical actor on the ground right now.
For Russia's strategy is based on presenting itself as an alternative to Western countries, capitalising on anti-imperialist sentiment and historical colonial grievances. Russia thus seeks to strengthen its international position and replace Western powers, especially France, in a resource-rich and strategically vital region.
It is also obvious that Putin conceives of his actions in Africa as a form of retaliation against NATO for its role in the Ukrainian war and to challenge Western influence on his southern flank. Russian disinformation has skilfully exploited the failure of Western counter-terrorism strategies, as well as the US's obligation to cut off security assistance following coups in countries now allied in the ESA.
Fuente Cobo also discusses Russia's exploitation of resources such as gold and strategic minerals. For example, Russia has managed to change mining codes to benefit its companies, citing the example of Niger, where it now controls 65% of gold mining licences and is looking to invest in uranium mining following the withdrawal of French companies.
To counter this Russian influence and destabilisation, Europe must adopt a comprehensive and ambitious approach that combines the fight against disinformation with support for governance, local development and transparent communication, seeking to regain lost influence.
As you can see, a tsunami is occurring in the Sahel desert. And that is why I insisted to Members of Congress that isolating and disengaging from the Sahel is not an option for Spain.
What happens in our neighbouring region to the South should concern us, but above all it should concern us. Spain has historically had an excellent relationship both with the countries now in the ESA and with ECOWAS as a whole, so I applaud and welcome the fact that our foreign policy is mindful of this and now seeks to play a leading and protagonist role in European relations with the Sahel.
And, looking towards our Islands, now that the Canary Islands Government is working on a new strategy for Africa, it is important that our institutions understand the relevance of the Sahel and adopt a focus on the African neighbour as a fundamental part of this strategy. It is a truism to say that the migratory pressure on the Canary Route has in the instability of the Sahel (as just expressed by Frontex) one of its important factors. So, once again, let us look to the Sahel, because under no circumstances should we turn our backs on what is now the chessboard of world geopolitics.