The Asian giant's relationship with the continent has changed, and it is no longer the eternal lender to African governments: now it is making a strong push to exert influence through new technologies.
In recent weeks, as a result of several readings of the articles that we compile daily from Casa África in the Africa Dossier (and distribute to more than a thousand contacts and upload to the web), we have delved deeper into how China's role on the continent is changing significantly, adapting to the new geopolitical reality that the world is experiencing.
For years, China's presence in Africa was interpreted through a relatively rigid framework: the image of an omnipresent actor financing grandiose projects, erecting public buildings almost symbolically, and granting loans to heavily indebted governments, fueling the narrative of the so-called "debt trap," which supposedly gave it considerable influence. This powerful, albeit simplistic, narrative portrayed China as a partner prioritizing its geopolitical influence at all costs, relegating democratic standards and human rights to a secondary position. However, the reality of 2026 confirms that this view is no longer sufficient to explain the recent evolution of the Sino-African relationship.
One statistic clearly marks this shift: in 2025, for the first time, African countries paid China more in debt repayments than they received in new loans. And this trend doesn't appear to be temporary. While Chinese loans to Africa exceeded $30 billion in 2016, by 2024 the volume had fallen to $2.1 billion, spread across just six carefully selected projects. The year-on-year declines—from 201Q3 to 201Q3—illustrate a deliberate reorientation. Beijing is no longer seeking to multiply megaprojects, but rather to concentrate on high-impact, technically sound, and economically sustainable initiatives focused on sectors that China considers essential for its global competitiveness: technology, renewable energy, telecommunications, and the digital economy. Geoeconomics is replacing the former prominence of heavy construction.
A good example is Angola (a country with which Spain maintains excellent relations), which in 2024 absorbed a quarter of all Chinese investment in Africa. This time, it wasn't for large dams or transcontinental highways, but for infrastructure related to telecommunications, port logistics, and urban development linked to the capital, Luanda. In other words, investments aimed at increasing economic efficiency, not expanding China's physical footprint on the continent.
This sectoral strategy is complemented by a monetary shift with profound implications: the partial dedollarization of financing. China has begun providing loans in yuan to protect itself from the volatility of the dollar and, at the same time, strengthen its currency in international trade. Several African countries have joined this trend. Kenya, for example, converted the debt associated with the Kenya Standard Gauge Railway (KSGR) into yuan with the expectation of saving up to $200 million in debt service. For Beijing, this move is part of a much broader race: the global struggle for the dollar's dominance against alternative currencies in an increasingly multipolar world.
But the central question remains the same: what is China seeking in Africa in this new context? One initial answer, which I already wrote about last week, points to the critical minerals essential for the energy transition. Cobalt, lithium, copper, and rare earth elements are the backbone of the electric vehicle revolution, a sector in which China comfortably leads. Securing their supply is a non-negotiable strategic objective.
However, the African continent is not merely a storehouse of raw materials. Africa is also a major political player. With 54 member states, it constitutes the largest voting bloc at the United Nations. For China, gaining African support is key to consolidating a multipolar order less dependent on the United States and more aligned with its own international interests. African votes endorse initiatives in multilateral forums, confer political legitimacy, and sustain long-term alliances.
Trade also reinforces this interdependence. When the United States imposed severe tariffs on Chinese imports during the Trump era, Africa became a safe haven. By 2025, Chinese exports to the continent had grown by 25.81%, partially offsetting the 20.1% decline in trade with the United States. Africa is thus ceasing to be a peripheral region and becoming a structural component of China's economic resilience.
But if one area symbolizes the current shift better than any other, it is technology. China's presence in Africa today is more evident in fiber optic cables than in roads and bridges. Huawei manages approximately 701% of the continent's 4G infrastructure and is driving the rollout of 5G in more than 30 countries. The mobile ecosystem (that is, the devices in Africans' hands) is clearly Chinese-owned: brands like Tecno and Infinix alone surpass the combined market share of Samsung and Apple, capturing more than 401% of the market.
Technological dominance is not limited to hardware. It extends to software, payment systems, and, increasingly, digital governance models. “Safe Cities” programs, driven by companies like Huawei, have brought video surveillance, facial recognition, and intelligent traffic management systems to countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe. Similarly, Chinese apps like Boomplay—a kind of “African TikTok”—and mobile payment platforms like Alipay and WeChat Pay have quickly become integrated into the daily lives of young Africans. China no longer just builds the ground they walk on; it also inhabits the devices they carry in their hands.
However, this technological shift is not happening on a passive continent. On the contrary, several African countries are using this new phase of the relationship to demand more favorable conditions. This is known as the growing African agency, a trend that has gained visibility in recent years. African governments are beginning to define clear priorities, demand genuine technology transfer, and impose regulations to prevent the leakage of added value.
The results are tangible. Morocco will soon inaugurate the continent's first gigafactory for electric vehicle batteries. Ethiopia and Kenya have evolved, in record time, from importing components to manufacturing their own electric vehicles. In Nairobi, electric motorcycles and buses are already being assembled, importing only the battery cells while progressing toward full-cycle manufacturing. These milestones would have been unthinkable a decade ago without a change in negotiating stance.
In parallel, several countries have tightened their raw material management policies. At least 13 African nations have banned the export of critical raw materials. This measure compels companies—including Chinese ones—to invest directly in local processing plants. The creation of special economic zones, such as the one between Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo to attract electric vehicle component manufacturers, reflects a more sophisticated and integrated continental strategy.
All of this points toward a new balance. China remains an essential partner, but it no longer single-handedly sets the pace of the relationship. Africa, increasingly aware of its economic and political value, is prepared to negotiate based on its own development priorities. The European Union-African Union summit held just two months ago in Angola perfectly exemplified this message: peer-to-peer relations with a clear undercurrent of ending and rejecting any colonial legacy, as reflected in the joint declaration at the summit's conclusion.
In this scenario, the central challenge for African leaders will not be reducing China's presence, but rather managing a smart diversification of alliances. States like Nigeria and South Africa are already opening themselves up to investments from the European Union and the United States in areas such as green energy, digital security, and financial innovation. Competition among powers can offer opportunities, provided that African governments stay the course and avoid repeating past dependencies.
The outcome of this new phase will not depend solely on Beijing. It will depend, above all, on Africa's capacity to translate its growing negotiating power into inclusive and sustainable development. This is an enormous challenge, but also a historic opportunity for a young, dynamic continent determined to play a central role in the world to come.